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PETRA LEA LÁNCOS∗ 
 
Case Note: Sison v. Council1–Human Rights or the Fight 
Against Terrorism–Do We Really Have to Choose?! 
 
 
On 1 February of this year the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its capacity as 
an appeals forum to the Court of First Instance (CFI) passed yet another judge-
ment relating to European acts containing lists defining persons suspected of 
association with terrorist activities. The judgement touches upon the important 
questions of access to documents of the European institutions as well as the 
human rights related to a fair trial and an effective legal remedy. It sheds light 
on the fact that although certain decision-making powers have been relocated to 
the European level, a parallel accommodation of legal protection has not 
followed suit thus leading to an unsatisfactory protection of human rights. In 
cases relating to terrorism, the European courts seem uneasy in applying the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by which the Community is 
bound. This tendency creates serious discrepancies in the legal regime of an 
entity committed to the respect of freedom, human rights and the rule of law.2 
 
 
1. Facts of the case 
 
Professor José Maria Sison is the chief political consultant of the National 
Democratic Front of the Philippines in the peace negotiations with the Govern-
ment of the Republic of the Philippines. After being released from Philippine 
prisons, he obtained refugee status in the Netherlands in 1988 and has been 
living there since. On 12 August 2002, the US Office of Foreign Asset Control 
listed Mr. Sison as a terrorist and ordered the freezing of his assets. Just one 
day later, without notice and without giving him the opportunity for a hearing 
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 1 Case C-266/05, Judgment of the Court of 1 February 2007–José Maria Sison v. 
Council of the European Union (“judgment”), not yet reported. 
 2 Article 6(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU). 
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the Dutch authorities listed Mr. Sison in a “sanction regulation against terrorism” 
ordering the freezing of his assets and the termination of all social benefits due 
to him. Two months later the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 
2002/848/EC3 linking Mr. Sison to the so-called New People’s Army, a para-
military communist revolutionary group classified as a terrorist organization 
by numerous countries as well as the EU4 and listing him as a terrorist suspect 
in the meaning of Decision 2580/20015–the basic European act for the purpose 
of combating terrorism. Two further Council decisions followed6 repealing the 
decision establishing the original list; however, both new decisions maintained 
Mr. Sison on the list of suspected terrorists. 
 
 
2. The applications 
 
Under Regulation 1049/2001 on the public access to documents (Regulation)7 
which ensures among others natural persons residing in a Member State the 
right of access to documents of Community institutions8 Mr. Sison requested9 
the Council to grant access to all documents that led to his inclusion and 
maintenance on the lists contained in the mentioned decisions as well as the 
  
 3 Council Decision of 28 October 2002 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) 
No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities 
with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2002/460/EC (OJ L 195 of 30 
October 2002). 
 4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_People's_Army (3.03.2007). 
 5 “Natural persons committing or attempting to commit an act of terrorism, partici-
pating in or facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism” Article 2 para 3 indent i) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures against certain 
persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344).  
 6 Council Decision of 12 December 2002 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation 
(EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and 
entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2002/848/EC (Decision 
Nr. 2002/974/EC; OJ 2002 L 337) and Council Decision of 27 June 2003 implementing 
Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing 
Decision 2002/974/EC (Decision Nr. 2003/480/EC; OJ 2003 L 160). 
 7 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parilament and of the Council of 30 
May 201 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents (“Regulation”, OJ 2001 L 145). 
 8 Article 2(1) of the Regulation. 
 9 Confirmatory applications of 11 December 2002, 3 February 2003 and 5 September 
2003. 
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disclosure of the identity of States submitting documents relevant in this 
respect.10 With regard to each application the Council refused access to such 
documents, stating that these were classified as ‘sensitive’‘ documents in the 
meaning of the Regulation11 and even partial access would prejudice the public 
interest regarding public security, and further, that the disclosure of the identity 
of the submitting states would undermine the public interest relating to the 
soundness of international relations of the Union. The Council pointed out that 
the Regulation provides for exceptions in such cases12 as well as in cases 
where disclosure has not been consented to by the originator.13 
 
 
3. Findings of the Tribunal in the judgement under appeal (T-110/03) 
 
Mr. Sison brought three successive actions before the CFI for the annulment of 
the Council decisions refusing access. The three cases were joined,14 whereas 
the first case was declared as inadmissible and unfounded, the second as 
unfounded and only the third was dealt with in essence by the Tribunal. In the 
judgement under appeal the CFI in general noted, that “it must be accepted that 
the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism presupposes that information held 
by the public authorities (…) is kept secret so that (…) effective action can 
be taken.”15 The Tribunal further confirmed that “institutions enjoy a wide 
discretion” in justifying the refusal of access with reference to the public 
interest in areas covered by the mandatory exceptions16 provided for by the 
Regulation.17 It found that, consequently, judicial review of such decisions is 
  
 10 Item 10 of the judgment. 
 11 Article 9(1) of the regulation provides: “Sensitive documents are documents origi-
nating from the institutions or the agencies established by them, from member States, third 
countries or International Organizations, classified as ‘TRÉS SECRET/TOP SECRET’ 
‘SECRET’ or ‘CONFIDENTIEL’ in accordance with the rules of the institution concerned, 
which protect essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member 
States in the areas covered by Article 4 (1) (a), notably public security, defence and 
military matters.” 
 12 Article 4(1)(a) of the regulation. 
 13 Ibid., Articles 4 (4)–(5). 
 14 Joined cases T-405/03, T-150/03 and T-110/03, Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 26 April 2005–José Maria Sison v. Council of the European Union (“judgment 
under appeal”) [2005] ECR II-1429. 
 15 Item 77 of the judgment under appeal. 
 16 Italics by me. 
 17 Ibid., item 46. 
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“limited to verifying whether the procedural rules and the duty to state reasons 
have been complied with, the facts have been accurately stated and whether 
there has been a manifest error of assessment of facts or a misuse of powers.”18 
In particular it stated that the “Council was not obliged, under the exceptions 
provided for [by the Regulation], to take into account the applicant’s particular 
interest in obtaining the documents requested”, namely, that these were 
necessary for him to secure his rights to a fair trial in the proceedings before 
the CFI.19 
 
3.1.  The appeal before the ECJ 
 
In his appeal against the judgements of the CFI, Professor Sison claimed that 
the ECJ set aside the contested judgements and annul the Council decisions 
refusing access to the requested documents, while the Council claimed the 
dismissal of the appeal.20 As the appeals against the judgements of the CFI 
dismissing the first two cases as unfounded was dismissed by the ECJ as 
inadmissible for lack of arguments brought in the appeal against these, the 
Court solely dealt with the appeal against third case, notably T-110/03.21 The 
appellant put forward five grounds of appeal centred upon his rights to a fair 
trial and access to documents, as well as the infringement of the duty to state 
reasons, the presumption of innocence and the right to an effective legal remedy. 
In its judgement the ECJ found one of the grounds for appeal inadmissible and 
all of the others unfounded, and it therefore dismissed the appeal.22 In the 
following I shall restrict my analysis to the first ground for appeal related to 
the breach of the right to a fair trial and an effective legal remedy. 
 
3.2.  Breach of fair trial rights and the right to effective legal remedy 
 
3.2.1. Arguments in appeal 
In his first ground of appeal the appellant referred to the principle of a fair trial 
in general and defence rights in particular, as well as the right to an effective 
legal remedy. The appellant submitted that in the light of Article 6(3)(a) of the 
  
 18 Ibid., item 47. 
 19 Ibid., items 53 and 71. 
 20 Items 21–22 of the judgment. 
 21 Ibid., items 23–24. 
 22 Ibid., item 109. In fact, ironically the Court even ordered Mr. Sison to pay the costs 
of the proceedings although all his assets had been previously frozen and all his social 
benefits had been cut. 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the right to a fair trial the 
Council is obliged to take into account his “legitimate interest in obtaining 
access to those documents, which concern him personally”23 as “everyone (…) 
has the right to be informed (…) of the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him.”24 Further, according to Mr. Sison, in the light of the same provision the 
CFI infringed his defence rights by dismissing his actions, limiting its scope of 
judicial review and dismissing the fair trial argument, thereby also breaching 
his right to an effective legal remedy enshrined in Article 13 ECHR.25 
 
3.2.2. Findings of the Court 
Concerning the appellant’s particular interest regarding the access to the 
documents in question, the ECJ pointed out that the CFI correctly observed 
that the purpose of the Regulation is to provide for general access to documents 
and not to “protect the particular interest which a specific individual may have 
in gaining access to one of them.”26 The Court found that exceptions contained 
in Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation provide for a mandatory refusal of access 
“without the need (…) to balance (…) those interests against those which stem 
from other interests.”27 Thus, the ECJ goes on to state “even assuming that 
the appellant has (…) a right to be informed in detail of the nature and cause of 
the accusation made against him, which led to his inclusion on the list at issue” 
such a right cannot be enforced by reference to the Regulation at hand.28 Exactly 
for this reason the Court rejected both claims regarding the infringement of 
defence rights and the right to an effective legal remedy. It seems to be saying 
that these rights cannot be exercised by recourse to the Regulation for the latter 
has not been designed for this purpose, and thus decisions denying access under 
the Regulation cannot result in a breach of such rights. 
 
  
 23 Ibid., item 28. 
 24 Article 6(3)(a) ECHR reads: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights:  
 (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him.” 
 25 Article 13 ECHR reads: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority not-
withstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity.” 
 26 Item 43 of the judgment. 
 27 Ibid., item 46. 
 28 Ibid., item 48. 
416 PETRA LEA LÁNCOS 
  
3.2.3. Assessment 
As a preliminary question it is important to note that not only the Member 
States but also the EC as well as “Community institutions are bound by the 
ECHR”,29 specifically, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights.30 As regards defence rights, arguments directly 
invoking the ECHR in cases before the European courts are admissible in so 
far as the Tribunal and the Court of Justice afford a “protection equivalent to 
that guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR”.31 However, it may be questionable 
whether the appellant may rely on Article 6(3)(a) ECHR in his case at all, for 
he has formally not been “charged with a criminal offence” as required by the 
Article and indeed, he was not facing criminal charges in any EU country.32 
However, in Deweer v. Belgium33 the European Court of Human Rights pointed 
out that the word ‘charge’ constituted an autonomous concept of a much rather 
substantive than formal meaning, where for example the “situation of the 
suspect has been substantially affected.”34 It cannot be denied that the freezing 
of assets or the revocation of benefits constitutes such a substantial change. A 
  
 29 Brown, L. N.–McBride, J.: Observations on the proposed accession by the 
European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights. American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 29 (1981) 695. 
 30 „Where (...) an international agreement provides for its own system of courts, 
including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the Contracting Parties to the 
agreement, and, as a result, to interpret its provisions, the decisions of that court will be 
binding on the Community institutions, including the Court of Justice”, Opinion 1/91, 
[1991] ECR I-06079; “The commitments emanating from the ECHR are already explicitly 
integrated in the EU treaties; they are an integral part of the community's legal order”, 
Lerch, M.: European Identity in International Society–A Constructivist Analysis of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Constitutionalism Web-Papers–ConWEB No. 2/2003 (note 
12), at 6; see further: Lavranos, N.: Concurrence of jurisdiction between the ECJ and other 
international courts and tribunals, EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference (31. 3.–
2. 4. 2005), Texas, 17; see also the Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 52(3) and its 
commentary, Borowsky, M.: Tragweite und Auslegung der Rechte und Grundsätze, 
marginal notes 10, 29, 30, 37, in: Meyer, J. (ed.): Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen 
Union, Baden-Baden, 2006. 
 31 Case T-112/98, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 20 February 2001–
Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG. v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR 
II-729.; see also: Brown, McBride, op. cit., 695. 
 32 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/nov/sison-application-2-T-150.pdf (24. 05. 
2007), 4. 
 33 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Deweer v. Belgium–6903/75 
[1980] ECHR 1 (27 February 1980). 
 34 Peukert, W.: Artikel 6 (Verfahrensgarantien), marginal note 48, in: Frowein, J. A. 
and Peukert, W.: EMRK-Kommentar, Kehl, 1996. 
 CASE NOTE: SISON V. COUNCIL–HUMAN RIGHTS OR… 417 
  
further qualification is that the reason for such a ‘charge’ must be a criminal 
offence, thus protection under Article 6 ECHR is guaranteed in all cases where 
the act allegedly committed by the suspect is deemed criminal in the legal 
order of the jurisdiction in question.35 It is obvious from the preamble of 
Council Regulation No. 2580/2001 on combating terrorism36 that terrorism 
constitutes a criminal act under European law. It follows, that both the Council 
and the Tribunal are fully bound by the fair trial rights enshrined in the ECHR 
which may further be invoked before the CFI and the ECJ. Thus, it seems that 
the Court’s brief hint in the judgment to the contrary (“even assuming that the 
appellant has (…) a right to be informed in detail“) is undue and Article 
6(3)(a) applies in full. 
 As regards the concurrence of the CFI and the ECJ in stating that the purpose 
of the Regulation is not to protect particular interests in obtaining access to 
documents, this statement holds true; however, this does not mean, that human 
rights do not figure in cases where a certain legislative act is not explicitly 
designed to consider, or does not even mention, human rights. Although it is 
correct that fair trial claims may not be based on the Regulation itself, the 
‘mandatory refusal’ provided for by Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation cannot 
hold without an at least possible exception for human rights. Consequently, the 
Council cannot use a specific ‘blanket’ provision of the Regulation to rid itself 
of the duty to respect human rights in general, and the right to a fair trial in 
particular. It follows that the Council cannot dispense with balancing public 
interests against “other interests” such as those related to securing the defence 
rights of the appellant.37 Naturally, the Council may still arrive at the conclusion 
in the individual case that the public interest as regards for example public 
  
 35 Ibid., marginal note 35, see further: http://www.legislationline.org/?tid=105&jid= 
60&less=false. 
 36 See recitals 1 and 2 of Council Regulation No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism 
(OJ 2001 L 344); Peukert, op. cit., marginal note 36. 
 37 Effective legal remedy requires that “the question whether the impugned measure 
would interfere with the individual’s [specific human] right (...) and, if so, whether a fair 
balance is struck between the public interest involved and the individual’s rights must be 
examined.” Cameron citing the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden–62332/00, not yet reported (6 June 2006), in: 
Cameron, I.: The European Convention on Human Rights, due process and United Nations 
Security Council counter-terrorism sanctions, Report prepared for the Council of Europe 
(2006), http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/public_international_law/ 
Texts_&_Documents/2006/I.% 20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf (24.05.2007), 20; see also: 
Borowsky, op. cit., marginal note 21. 
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security justifies a proportional restriction of the individual interest in gaining 
access to documents which may prove necessary for the realization of defence 
rights. At the same time, the legal review of the decisions of the Council and 
the judgement of the CFI may lead to a different result should the Regulation not 
be interpreted by both judicial instances as excluding a balancing of interests. 
 In accordance with the above, the Tribunal is also obliged to respect fair trial 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR. Defence rights guarantee, among other things, 
that the party to the proceedings is granted “sufficient, adequate and equal 
opportunity to deliver statements both factually and in a legal sense, and that 
the party is not put at a disadvantage in comparison to the other [party].”38 As 
the ECJ points out, contrary to the assertion of the appellant its defence rights 
had not been denied by the CFI in the sense that the arguments put forward by 
the appellant had been indeed considered and then dismissed.39 However, an 
other aspect of the right to a fair trial is the principle of ‘equality of arms’ 
which requires “that all material evidence for or against the accused must be 
disclosed to the defence”40 except in cases where measures restricting disclosure 
are strictly necessary, with the further qualification that “if a less restrictive 
measure can suffice then that measure should be employed.”41 The latter requires 
that the proceeding court has the means to establish whether the refusal of 
disclosure was strictly necessary and proportionate. 
 Based on the above it is questionable whether the appellant’s right to an 
effective legal remedy as provided for by Article 13 ECHR has not been 
violated.42 It is important to note that the right to effective judicial protection 
under the ECHR is bound to the breach of a particular human right under the 
same Convention. The appellant claimed that he had been denied an effective 
legal remedy against the breach of his right to be informed in detail of the 
cause of his inclusion on the lists in question, which also entails disclosure of 
evidence in this respect. As noted above however the ECJ found no breach of 
the right to be informed in detail. Referring to the fact that no breach of a 
human right under the Convention has taken place, the Court seems to be 
saying that this fact excludes the possibility of an infringement of the right to 
  
 38 Peukert, op. cit., marginal note 72 (my translation). 
 39 Item 50 of the judgment. 
 40 Cameron, op. cit., 13 (italics in the original). 
 41 Ibid., 14, citing the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, van Mechelen 
and Others v. Netherlands–21363/93; 21364/93; 21427/93 and 22056/93 [1998] 25 EHRR 
647 (23 April 1997). 
 42 In general see: Biernat, E.: The locus standi of private applicants under article 230 
(4) EC and the principle of judicial protection in the European Community, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 12/03, 22–23. 
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an effective legal remedy,43 that is: the lack of breach of a specific human 
right per se excludes the infringement of Article 13 ECHR and therefore also 
dismissed this part of the appeal. However the Court unduly applied a ‘shortcut’ 
in reviewing whether the right to an effective legal remedy has been breached 
by the CFI. The starting point of the review should not be the determination of 
whether the right to a fair trial (here: the right to be informed) has been 
breached or not and drawing conclusions therefrom regarding the infringement 
of Article 13 ECHR. Rather, the object of the review should have been the 
proceedings of the first instance court, the examination of whether it provided 
an effective legal remedy in assessing the breach of the appellant’s right to 
be informed by the Council. Even more so, as the right under Article 13 
presupposes merely an “arguable claim”44 instead of an established breach of a 
right under the Convention exactly because the right to an effective legal 
remedy is meant to facilitate the assessment whether such a breach has 
occurred at all. The right to an effective legal remedy not only secures the right 
to bring a case before a legal forum but also that the remedy provided by the 
latter is ‘effective’ in the sense that a “competent, independent appeals 
authority must exist which is to be informed of the reasons behind the 
decision, even if such reasons are not publicly available. The authority must be 
competent to reject the executive’s assertion that there is a threat to (…) 
security where it finds it arbitrary or unreasonable”. Albeit states (and mutatis 
mutandis also the EC) have a “margin of appreciation in how they apply Article 
13” especially in areas concerning public security, judicial remedy must still 
be afforded, and this “must be effective in practice as well as in law”.45 Thus, 
Article 13 ECHR requires that minimally the proceeding court has access to 
documents based on which it may establish whether claims exacting secrecy 
are well founded46 for “where a national authority does not take sufficiently 
into account, or is not capable of taking into account, the substance of the 
individual’s arguable claim that his or her Convention rights have been breached 
then there has been a breach of Article 13.”47 Consequently, the review of 
  
 43 Item 52 of the judgment.  
 44 Frowein, J. A.: Artikel 13 (“Beschwerderecht”), marginal note 2, in: Frowein, J. A. 
and Peukert, W.: EMRK-Kommentar, Kehl, 1996. 
 45 Cameron, op. cit., 20. 
 46 As Cameron points out “the (minimal) controls which operate in general on collection 
and transmission of security information could not compensate for the total absence of 
effective judicial remedies,” that is the conduct of the executive must be subject to possible 
judicial review. Ibid., 12–13. 
 47 Ibid., 19, referring to the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Klass and 
other v. FRG–5029/71 [1978]2 EHRR 214 (6 September 1978) (italics in the original), 19. 
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whether the CFI has afforded effective judicial remedy as regards the arguable 
claim relating to the breach of Article 6(3)(a) must entail the assessment 
whether the Tribunal has accessed the necessary information and examined the 
proportionality of the contested decision. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It seems that the European courts are yet uncertain in how to apply human rights 
in cases that relate to the fight against terrorism. The Sison case is a good 
example of this tendency: both the CFI and the ECJ unduly limit their scope 
of review according the Council excessive discretion in refusing access to 
documents, which leads to unsatisfactory results as regards the protection and the 
enforcement of human rights. As Cameron points out, “there are unfortunately 
many examples of purely formal mechanisms of challenge as far as security 
matters are concerned”, which give the illusion that human rights have been 
safeguarded, whereas in reality they have been mocked by faint proceedings. 
This way, there may be even more harm done than good48 for the EU in general 
and the victims of human rights infringement in particular. 
 
 
  
 48 Ibid., 14. 
